In 2008, the Department of Tarija became the epicenter of national political struggles over political autonomy for lowland regions at odds with the Morales administration.
Introduction: interpreting Bolivia's protests
The struggle that during 2008 pitted the so-called "media luna" departments of Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni and Pando against La Paz and the central government over the issue of autonomy -including access to and control of natural resource rentsbrought the country to the brink of generalized civil unrest. These conflicts have been interpreted as self-interested acts of conservatism orchestrated by civic committees and departmental political leaders in order to undermine the government of Evo Morales (Weisbrot and Sandoval, 2008) . Such interpretations are consistent with the argument that the demand for regional autonomy is a strategy of lowland elites who can no longer legitimately call on authoritarian interventions in the face of social processes that challenge their privilege and power (Eaton, 2007) , as well as with the argument that the cultivation of Tarijeño identity and interests is an elite strategy to foster regional affiliations and so prevent conflicts falling out along class lines (Vacaflores and Lizárraga, 2005) . While accepting much of these interpretations, this paper argues that they do not capture all that was going on in these mobilizations. We argue that it is important to recognize that departmental and sub-departmental conflict dynamics had their own histories and geographies -making it a mistake to interpret them only in terms of the current moment, or to view them as manifestations across four departments of the same general phenomenon. Likewise these conflicts had their own sets of motivations and grievances. While these appeared to manifest themselves as a moment of broader collective protest, they also indicate complex and at times divergent internal forces. This paper i explores the conflicts in one of the media luna ii departments, Tarija. The department has been little studied in comparison to Santa Cruz, but is nonetheless the most critical to the viability of the Movimiento hacia Socialismo (Movement Towards Socialism-MAS) government's resource extraction based path towards "post neoliberal" patterns of social and infrastructural spending (Weisbrot and Sandoval, 2008; Farthing, 2009; Bebbington, 2009) . Much media coverage of the 2008 events portrayed the Department of Tarija as being solidly in the camp of the media luna,
casting an image of a relatively well-off and mostly criollo -mestizo iii citizenry that fiercely opposed the indigenous-populist administration of President Evo Morales (The Economist, 2008) . However, this abbreviated version of departmental politics provides little insight into the intra-departmental sensitivities, identities and power struggles within Tarija, nor into its variant of the complex, ever shifting landscape of social movements, actors and political alliances in Evo's Bolivia.
We contend that "autonomist" and protest agendas vary across the media luna. What was distinctive to Tarija was the dispute with central government focused on access to and continued control over hydrocarbon rents (cf. Vacaflores and Lizárraga, 2005) , and the struggle to balance internal relationships within Tarija -in particular between the gas producing province of the Gran Chaco and the city of Tarija. Understanding what is going on inside Tarija therefore requires a look back into the department's history and the role of hydrocarbons in that history.
The paper is composed of four parts. The first lays out theoretical points of departure.
The second explains elements of the Tarijeño context, examines the trajectory of hydrocarbon extraction, and discusses how it has become the main axis of conflicts among different interests within Tarija as well as between them and the central government. While these interests have a class component, they have equally important geographical and ethnic dimensions. We argue that grievances had accumulated around gas for a number of years and were themselves part of much more sedimented regionalist grievances. The section discusses how conscious elite strategy and government decisions alike transformed these grievances into protest.
The third section focuses on the protest of September 2008, emphasizing the different actors involved and the convergences and divergences among the concerns that motivated them. The final section interprets these protests as deriving their motive force from grievances that are as much specifically Tarijeño as they are part of a wider set of concerns in the media luna, and which at the same time reflect tensions and fissures within MAS.
Identity, protest and resource economies
One of the insights of the literature on "new social movements" is that mobilization and protest occurs around identities that go beyond those of class, and that it is more the norm than the exception that actors in protest have multiple identities. While the theme of a protest might privilege interests linked to one of these identities, the others remain relevant. Rather than reflecting an essence, these identities are produced through the position of actors within networks of social relationships and discourses.
Identities might also be consciously cultivated as "strategic essentialisms" (Rubin, 1998) or as parts of the "invention of tradition" in order to strengthen claim making, recruit adherents and/or obfuscate other interests. However, such strategizing and invention does not occur in a historical vacuum, and material political economies set frames within which identities can be strategized and influence which sets of identities are more, and less, likely to be viable within a given geographical and historical context (Escobar, 2008) .
The emergence and construction of identities has been an important theme in efforts to explain the changing political landscapes of lowland Bolivia. Some authors (Eaton, 2007; Vacaflores and Lizárraga, 2005) draw attention to elite efforts to construct regional identities around a notion of regional grievance. They suggest, however, that this is a self-interested strategy. On the one hand, if regional identities dominate, then others based on class and ethnicity and which threaten elite power will not prosper.
Regional identities are viewed as being functional to elite efforts to control resources and continue to dominate regional political economy and society.
Other authors have emphasized the emergence and cultivation of indigenous identities in the lowlands and the rise of movements and organization around these identities (Albó, 2009; Postero 2006) . Such processes are as much endogenous as strategically cultivated, and can also involve an association of identity and grievances rooted in regional political economy. In particular, grievances related to the adverse effects of resource extraction have been part of this emergence of identities. A variant of this process that has received far less attention in the critical social sciences of Bolivia has been the emergence of a so-called Chaqueño culture both in the broader Chaco (of Bolivia, Paraguay and Argentina) as well as more specifically in the Chaco of Tarija.
This identity has also been cultivated throughout the twentieth century as one grounded in shared productive practices (ranching), shared culture (music, dance) and shared grievances (the suffering of the Chaco War and the marginalization of the Chaco within Tarija and Bolivia).
The emergence of such identities has several implications. First, the co-existence of distinct (strategically essentialized) and multiple identities suggests that the hegemony of any one of them is never stable. Second, identities are scaled, being simultaneously created and contested at the level of province, territory, department and nation. Third, grievance plays a central role in the construction of lowland identities, and grievance is always mobilized in relation to political economic history.
We suggest that it is important to recognize the co-existence of these scaled, multiple, aggrieved and historical political economy informed identities in order to understand as part of a process of progressive organization and liberation from various forms of subjugation including semi-slavery (Castro, 2004 (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) . Since then Bolivia's hydrocarbons have been nationalized on three occasions, the rationale each time being that Bolivia was not benefitting sufficiently from its natural resources (Miranda, 2008) . Yet, whether its hydrocarbon sector was under state control or in the hands of private operators, Bolivia has a history of negotiating unfavorable deals for its oil and gas vii (Ribera, 2008) .
The most recent privatization occurred during the first Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada as part of a broad initiative to consolidate neoliberal economic policies (Perreault, 2008) . The State withdrew from its operational role and created a series of mixed capital corporations between the state hydrocarbons agency, Yacimientos Petroleros Fiscales de Bolivia (YPFB) , and private transnational firms for oil and gas exploration, transportation and refining. Transnational firms were to make a 50 percent capital investment, the other 50 percent of the company being owned by YPFB employees and pension funds (Kohl 2002; Kohl 2004; Kohl and Farthing 2006 While these transformations passed largely under the political radar during the first Sánchez de Lozada regime (Kohl, 2002) , this was not the case in his second term , a mechanism to increase both producing and nonproducing regional governments' share of hydrocarbon revenue. However because the agreement to introduce and distribute the IDH was crafted "in a climate of profound social and political crisis and in the midst of a series of conflicts, (the assignation of benefits) corresponded more to the pressure, struggles and protest to capture rents than to any planning and analysis about what to do with these rents." (Fundación Jubileo, 2008) . Some analysts argue that the result has been a confusing system that sustains highly unequal IDH transfers (ranging from US$751. (Table 1) .
( Table 1 about (Perreault, 2008) . This generated excitement around the possibility of massive infrastructure projects related to the transport and export of these gas reserves (Hindery, 2004) . It is this view of development that leads political leaders in Tarija, as well as much of the population (even some who are in other respects supporters of MAS), to view the struggle over departmental revenue from gas as fundamental to the department's ambitions for regional economic development and effective autonomy. 
Triggers to protest: IDH, autonomy and the revocatorio

Resource Regionalism, IDH and Revenue Disputes
Arguments that tie regional development to regional natural resource endowments and to the claim that these resources and the revenue flowing from them should be controlled and used by regional actors are a key part of what we refer to as resource regionalism. Grievances frequently become bundled with this regionalism with claims that after years of disadvantage and marginalization it is now time for regions to be able to take full advantage of their endowments. While such resource regionalism has a long history in Tarija, it has intensified with the gas boom and the significant increase in the resources at stake since the introduction of the IDH under Hydrocarbons Law 3058. Presently Tarija produces over 60 percent of Bolivia's natural gas and receives fully 30 percent of all royalties and IDH generated in Bolivia.
Indeed, the IDH has further consolidated resource regionalism by providing a clear mechanism on which to peg demands for greater fiscal decentralization in the extractives sector.
In the face of a situation in which a department with 5 percent of the population receives 30 percent of gas royalties and IDH, the argument for a change in the distribution of gas revenue gained momentum. Commentators and leaders from disadvantaged highland departments called for a more equitable formula based on population and poverty indicators (Barragán, 2008) and for a distribution that would contribute to a diversification of the economic base (Wanderley, 2008; Gray Molina et al, 2005) . The media luna for its part refused to accept the government's attempts to claw back these resources for national social programs, arguing that by law the money belonged to the regions (La and that what was actually at stake was, according to a senior figure in Tarija's prefecture, a "government … seeking to consolidate absolute power and reconstitute a State that does everything …interrupting the process of decentralization and strangling the Prefectural (departmental) governments" (Lea Plaza, 2009) . The irony in this claim is, as we will note later, that leaders in the Gran Chaco province had much the same view of the departmental government in Tarija.
The Referendum on Autonomy -advantage Tarija and the media luna
In this context, the political leaders of the media luna effectively deployed the recuperation of IDH revenues as a rallying point to promote the case for regional autonomy. In doing so they captured a popular historical demand for politicaladministrative decentralization (Suso, 2008) . They collapsed this demand, however, to a simple call for "autonomy," an expression that was embraced uncritically by large The run up to the Tarija autonomy referendum took on a carnival like atmosphere.
Large banners swathed the balconies of departmental and municipal buildings in the main plaza while Chaqueño music blared from loudspeakers. Critics of the referendum pointed to the improvised and vague nature of Tarija's autonomous bylaws which, they said, would only deepen structures sustaining elite power and privilege fed by Tarija's new found gas wealth (Valdez, 2008) . Rural leader Luis
Alfaro dismissed the bylaws as a document prepared by and for the right and its logias (lodges) and argued that autonomy must be pursued within the framework of the new constitution. The Guaraní and Weenhayek leadership criticized the bylaws as discriminatory for failing to recognize indigenous autonomy while regional political leaders in the Provinces of Gran Chaco and Arce expressed disagreement with the process which they saw as marginalizing provincial calls for greater decentralization within the department. Nevertheless, of the nearly 62 percent of Tarijeños who voted over 78 percent favored the proposed autonomy bylaws. The elite-dominated local press immediately reported this as a resounding victory for the autonomic forces (Nuevo Sur, 2008) . However viewed more closely, the results of the referendum reveal a much more divided Tarija based on rural-urban and ethnic lines. While in recent elections absenteeism in Tarija has typically ranged between 10 and 15 percent across all provinces, this time rates were far higher, particularly in more rural provinces beyond the urban core (Table 2 ). In the Province of Arce, where MAS has established a strong base among rural workers and urban migrants, less than half of all eligible voters participated in the referendum and with a department-wide rate of absenteeism at 38 percent, clearly many eligible voters decided to sit out the election.
( Table 2 about here)
The Revocatorio -advantage Morales and MAS
The idea of holding a recall referendum (revocatorio) on whether or not to revoke the 2008) . The three other Prefects of the media luna were also ratified. In Tarija, Cossio was supported by 58 percent of voters while Morales was confirmed by slightly less than 50 percent of voters (see Table 3 ( Table 3 about here) Following the election, Morales adopted a more conciliatory tone. In his victory speech he called on the Prefects to set aside differences and carry on the work of recovering the country's natural resources and building a more unified Bolivia . However, the media luna Prefects, joined by the recently elected and pro-autonomy Prefect of Chuquisaca, moved to reactivate the Consejo Nacional Democrático ( National Democratic Council-CONALDE) and initiated a vigorous effort to undercut Morales' authority. Abandoning efforts to negotiate a solution to the impasse, media luna leaders called on their bases to prepare a civic strike for mid August -a precursor to the growing storm.
Mobilizing grievance
The preceding sections have suggested that three factors -the IDH, autonomy and the recall referendum -became increasingly merged and had the effect of intensifying conflicts between the media luna and the central government at the same time as deepening certain ambiguities among voters. All this was the tinder for the conflict that unfolded in Tarija as Cossio and other leaders moved to strike to protect revenues and demand autonomy.
The strike began in the city of Villa Montes in the Chaco. In one sense this seemed an unlikely origin given its remoteness and its history of relatively weak social mobilization. It was, however, a symbolically significant place to start given its role in the Chaco War as the headquarters of the Bolivian army and a key line of defense toward the end of the war. The parallel drawn by the opposition was that chaqueños were mobilizing once again to protect the country's hydrocarbon resources. xx Also, Reynaldo Bayard, President of Tarija's Civic Committee, is from Villa Montes and was there throughout the strike.
Shortly after the strike was called in Villa Montes, Yacuiba, the largest city in the Province of Gran Chaco, and situated along the border with Argentina, announced it was also joining the strike. With the border crossing closed, all transport between Eastern Bolivia and Argentina shut down. The participation of Yacuiba was significant because while MAS has a core of urban and rural migrant supporters there, on the autonomy issue Cossio and Civic Committee were able to recruit significant local support for the strike.
After ten days of fruitless protest chaqueño leaders acknowledged that the only ones who seemed to be suffering from the strike were the chaqueños themselves, and demanded that the urban areas of the media luna also strike. Local leaders then demanded that both Tarija and Santa Cruz strengthen their protest or face having their domestic gas supplies cut off. The threat was clear: "if you don't all turn out as Tarijeños, we will act against you as Chaqueños."
In Tarija, the mobilization of the middle and upper classes took place via the Civic
Committee and other social organizations xxi but this was not enough. While public employees of the Prefecture were also mobilized en masse, the campaign was in desperate need of warm bodies. Bringing members of the much feared Unión Juvenil
Cruceñista (a sort of youth militia based in the Department of Santa Cruz) was decided against for the sensitivities it raised. Instead, university students in Tarija, who had participated in the campaign for autonomy, were mobilized to occupy the blockades -particularly in the Chaco -but also to participate in the take over and occupation of public buildings and to attend political rallies. policemen assigned to guard the building. Behind the shock troop were a few young women and older adults -including parents and other relatives -who supported the young men with bottles of water, vinegar (to counteract the effects of the tear gas) and shouts of encouragement. The encounter was intense but brief and without casualties (despite sticks of dynamite being tossed at the police). Shortly after the building was taken over, a 4x4 appeared and out came a contingent of Tarija's Civic Committee members to claim victory. Not everyone was feeling victorious however. Some neighborhood residents (also in favor of autonomy) expressed dismay at the disorder and level of violence unfolding before them. Tarija, they said, not even in the worst of times, had descended into this level of violence.
That evening the Vice-Rector of Tarija's university, UAJMS, expressed his full support for the student occupation of government buildings, indicating that Tarija must protect its IDH, royalties and University: the government needs to listen, xxiv .
Like other public figures he cultivated the logic of grievance, conveying an image of Tarija as the forgotten department that, having found natural gas, must now find its own development path. Not only an instrument of development, this gas was also one of protest he implied, supporting the suggestion that closing off the valves to gas lines in the Chaco might be a good way to get the (central) government's attention.
On the third full day, the general strike turned violent. Responding to rumors that members of the Federation of Peasant Communities of Tarija, supporters of Morales and MAS, intended to march on the city's main square, the right mobilized to prevent the march. Civic leaders called upon residents to maintain a permanent vigil and to defend their city. When MAS sympathizers failed to appear, a mob of pro-autonomy supporters headed to the Mercado Campesino, a MAS stronghold, for a showdown.
An angry and violent confrontation pitched students and other urban youth against market vendors and peasants. Over 80 people were injured, including a young construction worker who lost his hand when he mishandled a stick of dynamite .
In the Chaco, local residents were pressured to shut their businesses and offices or risk retaliation. The Civic Committee of Villa Montes controlled all activity in the city and had all major routes effectively blocked. During the height of the strike, the government reported that a section of the major pipeline (GASYRG) transporting natural gas to Brazil and operated by Transierra S.A. xxv , was damaged when protestors attempted to shut off one of the valves. There was also damage reported to the CHLB liquid gas plant (a firm that had been recently nationalized) in Villa Montes.
Saul Avalos, then Minister of Hydrocarbons denounced the disruption of gas supplies as right wing efforts to sabotage Bolivia's economy and jeopardize the delivery of gas supplies to neighboring countries. xxvi According to Avalos, the country stood to lose some US$8 million per day in lost gas sales to Brazil. For their part, representatives of Brazilian energy interests assured the Bolivian public that the affected gas fields and pipelines were under their control and that production had been only temporarily interrupted.
Tarija with its three daily papers and its own television stations, provided a steady stream of pro autonomy, pro strike analysis. Throughout the strike period, Morales accused the press of an anti-government bias and of being instruments of oppositional forces. Indeed, as elsewhere in Latin America, the Bolivian press is controlled by elite interests and in Tarija it played an important role in cultivating grievance and celebrating regional identity prior to and during this strike. And yet the press also, if inadvertently, contributed to a loss of motivation among some supporters of the strike.
The images of racist confrontations and acts of vandalism in the City of Santa Cruz and above all the news from Pando of armed confrontation and dozens of deaths and disappearances traumatized many Tarijeños who otherwise identified with many of the grievances underlying the strike. xxvii The triumphalist rhetoric that had characterized public discourse in Tarija for so many months gave way to appeals for peace, dialogue and mutual understanding. As quickly as the protest began, it subsided. Tarijeños returned to their daily routines but now with a social fabric considerably more frayed and with the realization that few concessions had been gained. As one resident poignantly remarked: "the confrontation between the students and vendors in the Mercado Campesino was absolute madness: "one day we go to buy our tomatoes and potatoes from the vendor, the next day we are throwing rocks at each other and tomorrow we will go back and buy our tomatoes and potatoes again" (Torrez, 2008) .
Interpreting protest: conflicts within and between resource nationalism and resource regionalism
In the face of generalized and generalizing interpretations of events in contemporary Bolivia, and particularly of the motivations deemed to have underlain the events of 2008, the intent here has been to describe processes that appear less unitary, and more embedded in longer historical geographies, than media and other renditions have suggested.
First, the conflicts in Tarija cannot be understood independently of natural gas. The history of hydrocarbons -and the failure to derive either great national or significant regional benefit from their extraction -inspires latent regionalist and nationalistic grievances for many actors. Meanwhile, in the contemporary context, gas has become central to the way in which the key actors think about development. As one leading figure in Tarija put it, paraphrasing, "people in Tarija began to wake up in the morning thinking about gas." Gas became the source of rents that, if accessed and controlled, could be used to sustain other projects. For the departmental government, gas rents became the essential ingredient for regional investment projects and patronage. For Tarija's Civic Committee control of gas rents became the means of staking out effective autonomy from La Paz. For business, gas rents offered the possibility of new entrepreneurial opportunities through subcontracts. For the university, gas rents offered an unprecedented revenue stream. Meanwhile, for the Province of Gran Chaco gas was a political instrument, a vehicle for determining its relationships with Tarija and the country. And for the different indigenous organizations in the Chaco, what happened with gas would determine the future of their territorial claims.
Gas became equally central to how the national government saw its project. Morales and MAS need gas revenue to fund social and industrialization programs and to compensate for an otherwise very narrow tax base. At the same time MAS needs gas to sustain its political project -gas and its nationalization has been symbolically central to MAS's agenda. Thus, while the central government resists autonomy for nationalist and constitutional reasons, it also does so for reasons of simple political strategy.
xxviii Second, gas has become a resource that divides Tarija. It does so along boundaries that rather than being simply regional/national are instead defined by differences of view as to the political scale at which gas and the revenues it generates should be Third, resource regionalism is and will continue to be a significant factor in hydrocarbon and decentralization politics in Bolivia. This is so first because it is a motivation and identity that cannot simply be explained as a product of elite strategies to build regional identities and thus block conflict around class or ethnic cleavage.
Supporters of MAS have regional (and ethnic territorial) identities also that have every likelihood of influencing how they will respond to government policy on hydrocarbons. This has been clear in recent conflicts between indigenous organizations and the government over oil exploration in the North of La Paz.
Fourth, resource regionalism will be important because MAS has apparently embraced it at the same time as rejecting some of its manifestations. Morales himself has spoken of the need to correct the imbalances caused by spatial unevenness in the distribution of the IDH. Part of MAS' response has been to promote extraction in other departments so that they too might have revenue from royalties. In short, it appears that MAS is ready to foster a whole set of resource regionalisms in order "to establish an economic and political equilibrium between departments and regions of the country" (Morales, 2008, October) . apparently overplayed its hand on autonomy and so divided internally, the risk that MAS could overplay its hand on gas and induce protest from its own bases is real.
xxxii Argentina's growing internal debt led to an arrangement whereby Bolivia accepted payment in-kind, i.e. equipment in exchange for gas -equipment that was considered of questionable value. After both governments had lost track of the value of these improvised and complicated arrangements it was agreed that each government would forgive any outstanding debts of the other and start anew (Lema, 2008) . See also Quiroga Santa Cruz (1977) for a critical historical assessment of hydrocarbons negotiations with Brazil in the 1970s.
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